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A Reply to Yee 
 
 
I start this commentary with two confessions.  
First, I must admit that I lack the capacity to engage in any detail with Yee’s attentive musical 
and semiotic analysis of the piece in question. I will therefore assume the validity of the analysis, except 
for a minor, but relevant caveat regarding rumination.  
Second, I confess I am of broadly formalist sympathies, in that I regard the enjoyment of absolute 
music to consist primarily in the understanding of the abstract structure of a music piece. While I do think 
that expressive properties play a considerable role in the appreciation of music, I deny that their 
appreciation requires, encourages, or even supports, in the majority of cases, a narrative or referential 
framework. In this I am in line with Peter Kivy, and from him I borrow the following modest claim 
regarding the coexistence of formalist listening with other approaches.  
 
Whether or not the ‘formalist’ way of listening to so-called ‘absolute music’ is the only 
acceptable, fruitful way of listening, it is certainly one acceptable, fruitful way of 
listening.  (2001, 167) 
 
The first part of this commentary deals with two possible challenges to Yee’s claim regarding the 
profundity of the Kreutzer sonata. The second part takes issue with an aspect of Yee’s interpretation of it, 
namely the claim that depressive rumination is presented by the work.  
 
I. 
The first challenge is a request for clarification, and it may be summarised in the question: “who, exactly, 
is profound?” 
If the interpretation of the piece as presenting some of the symptoms of depressive states is 
mandated by the piece as the work of art it is (a Beethoven sonata), then we have good reasons to say that 
it is Beethoven who is profound. On the other hand, if Yee’s interpretation, while informed by an analysis 
of the musical material, is one among many possible interpretations of the piece, then it seems 
inappropriate to credit Beethoven alone for a profundity that is partly derived from an interpretive 
enterprise conducted by someone else. I illustrate this worry with an example.  
Petr Eben’s organ work Moto Ostinato, the third movement from his Musica Dominicalis, seeks 
to represent the perennial battle between good and evil by means of opposing melodic and contrapuntal 
forces. Hamilton (2014) has suggested that the piece is apt for use in the Palm-Passion liturgy, grounding 
the claim in an analysis of the work. For instance, regarding the beginning of the piece, he notes that 
 
The unrelenting rhythmic figure can underscore the sense of motion in both the physical 
sense of Jesus’ entry, as well as the figurative moving toward his inevitable death. 
Though the ostinato rhythm is displaced and manipulated, it is rarely absent.   
(Hamilton 2014, 30) 
 
If the interpretation of Moto Ostinato as about the Passion of Christ is profound – something we 
can grant for the sake of the argument – then the credit for this profundity goes to both Eben and 
Hamilton, as the latter has supplied a more specific meaning for the rather general narrative of the original 
piece.  
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The issue now is whether Yee’s interpretation of the work as profound is actually an 
interpretation of the work as interpreted by Yee as profound. Recall that Yee borrows Dodd’s 
characterisation of musical profundity. Now, Dodd’s characterisation of profound music is built upon a 
notion of aboutness that rests on a work’s capacity to display certain properties. Which properties are 
displayed by a work, of all the properties that are possessed by it? Dodd’s answer is that the properties 
displayed by a work are those that appear to the attentive and competent listener as crucial to the piece’s 
artistic meaning. This meaning, in turn, is determined by a bundle of “intentional, contextual, and 
conventional factors […]” (Dodd 2014, 311).  
While Yee gives reason to think that he is not after an unconstrained interpretation of the piece, 
he does not offer compelling reasons to believe that Beethoven himself regarded the piece as a musical 
presentation of depressive symptoms. Depression, Yee informs us, hit Beethoven throughout his life, but 
he hastens to add that “one need not make as specific an interpretation as this”. But is this enough to 
warrant the presence of an authorial intention? And if Beethoven’s intention to present rumination in the 
piece is missing, is the description of the piece, qua Beethoven’s piece, as profound compromised?  
But let us put aside for a moment the concern regarding who exactly is being profound, and move 
to the second, more radical challenge to Yee’s claim that the first movement of the Kreutzer sonata is 
profound.  
Under Dodd’s account, profundity requires aboutness, but isn’t exhausted in aboutness.1 A work 
of music, if it is to count as profound, should not simply be about profound things, it should also allow us 
to “gain previously unattained insight into the nature of these things”. (Dodd 2014, 321). 
Granted that the Kreutzer sonata is about a profound and significant aspect of our psychological 
life such as depression, in what way does it provide an insight into its nature? For it wouldn’t be enough 
to present the dynamic structure of depressive states – this is something we could have learnt more 
precisely from a textbook. Yee concludes the paper with a rather general gloss on the value of negative 
emotions aroused by music. Perhaps this is meant to show that the Kreutzer sonata is profound precisely 
insofar as it allows us to feel what it is like to be in a state of depressive rumination? If this is the case, 
Yee’s thesis would resonate with some recent proposals regarding the value of expressiveness in the arts. 
(Robinson 2005, 2007)  
 
II. 
As anticipated, it is not my intent to question Yee’s general interpretation of the work. However, I devote 
the second part of this commentary to a remark on the musical representation of depressive rumination. I 
worry that this may not be possible in point of principle for a work of absolute music.  
My first worry concerns the temporal structure of rumination. Depressive rumination extends 
over weeks, months, perhaps even years. Its morbid character is precisely related to the fact that the 
subject chews on her problem for too long – hence the name ‘rumination’. In order for something to 
represent rumination, it is insufficient to present recurring states of malaise: the recurring negative state 
must be a familiar presence in one’s life over a significant period of time.  
Hence the problem: the temporal structure of music underdetermines the possible temporal 
structures represented by the music. The temporal order of musical events could be a real-time 
presentation of the corresponding extra-musical events, but this need not be the case – it shouldn’t be, if 
rumination is the relevant extra-musical process. But there is no principled way to determine the relation 
between musical temporality and extra-musical temporality in a piece of pure music.   
My second worry is about the sort of aboutness that is needed in order to have a musical 
representation of rumination. For rumination isn’t simply a recurring bad mood. It is one’s thinking about 
the causes of one’s own depressive state, or about the nature of the emotional state itself. To ruminate is 
to engage in some sort of self-reflection. (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) 
If this is the case, it would seem impossible to represent rumination in absolute music, as absolute 
music lacks meaning of the propositional sort. It may then be that, while propositional content isn’t 
necessary to musical aboutness (and consequently to musical profundity), it is necessary if music is to be 
about matters such as rumination, which involve recurrent, obsessive thinking.  
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But perhaps I am being unduly demanding in considering a propositional content as necessary to 
the musical presentation of rumination. For, while rumination may necessarily involve thinking when it 
occurs in real life, it does not follow from this that rumination could not be represented without a 
propositional content. As an example, consider the way in which the movie Gran Torino (2008) presents 
the protagonist’s tormented relation with his past, both through occasional flashbacks and the attitude 
exhibited towards his Hmong neighbours. While we aren’t confronted with any specific linguistic 
description of Walt Kowalski’s state of mind, we understand that his solitary late life is haunted by the 
horrors of the war, and especially by remorse for the accidental killing of a Korean boy who intended to 
surrender. In this example, rumination (or a relevantly similar process) is presented without the need of 
linguistic description.  
If this is the case, it may then be possible for music to do the same.  
Once more, however, I am inclined to dismiss this possibility: what the cinematic examples teach 
us it that rumination may do without propositional content, but also that it requires at least two things. 
First, an intentional object, that is, something the ruminating subject is thinking about – for instance, 
one’s lost love. Second, the representation of the intentional object as the cause of the subject’s current 
state of mind – for instance, the circumstances of one’s loss in love are repeatedly revisited and held as 
the cause of one’s depressed state of mind. 
One is left wondering how absolute music could meet these requirements: while pure music is 
certainly able to express emotional states, it does so without specifying the object of the emotional 
response. And even if it did it, this by itself would not be sufficient to convey the idea that the object is a 
past event that is considered as the cause of the emotional state the music is expressive of.  
I have advanced two reasons to think that rumination couldn’t possibly be represented in a purely musical 
form, one related to its temporal unfolding, and the other to its intentional structure. If I am wrong, then 
either I am mistaken regarding the requirements for the musical representation of rumination, or I have 
failed to see how a piece of pure music could meet such requirements. If the latter is the case, it needs to 
be shows how the Kreutzer sonata does it. 
Finally, I believe it is appropriate to note how, despite Yee’s anti-formalist approach, Kivy would 
have been glad to see that musicologists and composers are still willing to grapple with philosophical 
theses, and philosophers willing to reply back.  
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NOTES 
																																								 																				
1 For an account of musical profundity that does not require aboutness, see Davies (2002). 
